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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

PROTECTING THE IMPARTIAL JURY: A SOLUTION OF
QUESTIONS
INTRODUCTION
God of heaven! have we already under our form of government (which we
have so often been told is the best calculated of all governments to secure all
our rights) arrived at a period when a trial in a court of justice, where life is at
stake, shall be but a solemn mockery, a mere idle form and ceremony to
transfer innocence from the gaol to the gibbet, to gratify popular indignation,
1
excited by bloodthirsty enemies!

The tensions between the First Amendment rights of liberty of the press
and freedom of expression and those of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to
an impartial jury are not new, but have rather transformed with each new age
and advent of technology.2 As far back as 1807, United States’ courts have
wrestled with the tension of pretrial publicity and its effects on juror
impartiality. In the famed treason trial of former Vice President Aaron Burr,3
counsel for Burr, Luther Martin,4 expressed concern that Burr would be unable

1. Argument of Luther Martin in the Aaron Burr Trial, UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-KANSAS
CITY SCHOOL OF LAW, http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/burr/martinagrument.html
(last visited Jan. 23, 2015).
2. MATTHEW D. BUNKER, JUSTICE AND THE MEDIA: RECONCILING FAIR TRIALS AND FREE
PRESS 1 (Lawrence Erblaum Assocs. 1997).
3. The “Burr Conspiracy” began with Burr’s fall from political grace in the aftermath of his
fatal duel with former Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton. In need of a new, untapped
source of power, Burr turned to the western territories where he gained disreputable and gullible
friends as well as funding for his new, largely clouded schemes. Although the truth of Burr’s
plans has never been fully decided, it has been argued that his aims in amassing funding, supplies,
and allies was to take control of a portion of Spanish owned Florida, and combine it with the
newly, loosely governed western territories, in order to detach from the United States and create a
new state, with himself as its leader. However, before Burr could enact his plans, one of his allies,
James Wilkinson, governor of the recently-purchased Louisiana Territory, turned Burr in to
President Jefferson, most likely in an attempt to clear his own name. While attempting to flee the
United States for Europe in order to escape arrest, Burr was intercepted and brought up on charge
of treason. See DAVID S. HEIDLER & JEANNE T. HEIDLER, OLD HICKORY’S WAR: ANDREW
JACKSON AND THE QUEST FOR EMPIRE 1–5 (2003); MARSHALL SMELSER, THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC: 1801–1815 112–123 (1968).
4. Luther is a recognized figure in American history, although perhaps not as well-known
as he should be in the author’s opinion. A supporter of American independence, delegate to the
1787 Constitutional Convention who opposed strong central government, defense counsel in
attempted impeachment proceedings of Chief Justice Samuel Chase in 1805, and the Maryland
415
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to have a fair trial due to the preconceived biases of the public and potential
jurors.5 In making this argument to Chief Justice Marshall, Luther stated, “I
have with pain heard it said that such are the public prejudices against Colonel
Burr, that a jury, even should they be satisfied of his innocence, must have
considerable firmness of mind to pronounce him not guilty.”6
Although the Court’s acquittal of Burr is important for any number of
reasons – narrowly defining treason and the refusal of a sitting president to
testify or supply documentation to an ongoing trial – Chief Justice Marshall’s
response to concerns about the effects of an impartial jury has been extremely
influential in the legal field’s understanding of what constitutes an impartial
juror.7 Marshall wrote, “an impartial jury as required by the common law, and
as secured by the constitution, must be composed of men who will fairly hear
the testimony which may be offered to them, and bring in their verdict
according to that testimony, and according to the law arising on it.”8 He further
noted that it would be foolish for a court of law to expect informed jurors to be
without opinions prior to hearing evidence presented to them at trial.9 The
goal, Marshall believed, is that those jurors perform their jury duty while
keeping an open mind and allow their decisions to be made on what is
presented in trial rather than on a prejudiced opinion obtained from extraneous
information gathered outside the confines of the courtroom.10
In light of Marshall’s interpretation of jury impartiality, this note will
examine the tensions between the First and Sixth Amendments, especially in
the context of the ever-present and growing reliance upon technology and the
internet as means of communication. Further, it will advocate for a stronger,
more effective use of voir dire as a means to combat pretrial publicity in order
to uphold the impartiality of the jury. Section I will survey the tensions
between the First Amendment’s freedom of speech and press, and the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee of a trial by an impartial jury. Section II will look at
media and internet use in America in order to show its widespread,
omnipresent nature. In Section III, the focus will be on the effect of pretrial
publicity on potential jurors, as evidenced through academic studies,

Attorney General who argued the landmark McCulloch v. Maryland case, Luther’s impact on the
American legal system is widespread, yet underappreciated. National Archives and Records
Administration, America’s Founding Fathers: Delegates to the Constitutional Convention,
Maryland, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_founding_fathers_mary
land.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2015).
5. Argument of Luther Martin, supra note 1; THE AARON BURR TREASON TRIAL 34
(Charles F. Hobson ed., Fed. Jud. Center 2006).
6. Argument of Luther Martin, supra note 1.
7. THE AARON BURR TREASON TRIAL 1 (Charles F. Hobson ed., Fed. Jud. Center 2006).
8. U.S. v. Burr, 25 F.Cas. 49, 50 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
9. Id.
10. Id.
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statements from judges who have encountered the problem, and analyses of
cases on the subject. Finally, Section IV narrows the scope to examine how
these problems have affected Missouri courts and how the State is prepared to
handle the future of such misconduct.
I. TENSIONS BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS
Two of the most valued rights in the United States Constitution’s Bill of
Rights are the First Amendment’s freedom of speech and press and the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee of a fair and impartial jury trial.11 Although these two
rights do not necessarily contradict each other, there is certainly a tension
between the two when it comes to media coverage of a trial.12 When does the
media’s First Amendment right invade and endanger the fair trial rights of a
defendant? Should one set of rights be forced to give way to the other?
A.

The First Amendment
“Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
13
press. . .”

The First Amendment has always been a dominating set of rights for
Americans. To many, it is “enshrined. . . to facilitate robust debate and
discussion essential to democratic self-government. It serves as a bulwark
against government encroachment on individual expression. It offers a safe
harbour against laws or officials seeking to punish dissenters or silence
unpopular views.”14 The freedom of the press in particular is believed to allow
for greater security for the citizenry.15 In fact, America’s democratic values
dictate that the people’s ultimate sovereignty must correlate directly with the
freedoms enjoyed by the press.16 As Tocqueville remarks in Democracy in
America, “Whenever each citizen is granted the right to govern society,
recognition has to be given to his capacity to choose between the different
viewpoints which trouble his fellow citizens and to appreciate the different
facts which may guide his judgment.”17 Thus the press’ liberty encapsulates
the individual American’s rights to be free from tyranny.

11. James Landman, Balancing Act: First and Sixth Amendment Rights in High-Profile
Cases 69 SOC. EDUC. 182, 182 (2005).
12. Id.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
14. Free Speech and Media: Little to ‘Like’, THE ECONOMIST, (December 3, 2014),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2014/12/free-speech-and-social-media.
15. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 211 (Penguin Books 2003) (1840).
16. Id.
17. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

418

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXV:415

While the Amendment provides for the freedoms of speech and press,
implicit there are also the freedoms to listen and have public access to trials.18
But what about the public’s access to information gathered pretrial? Herein lies
the dangerous potential for perspective jurors to develop biases and prejudices
before hearing evidence on the matter. One example of pretrial publicity
having effects on potential jurors is when evidence is found to be inadmissible
ahead of trial.19 If this evidence is reported on by media outlets, there is great
potential for the jury pool to be influenced before they are even chosen for the
case.20
Courtrooms traditionally have been accessible areas.21 However, courts
have also stated that while reporting garners some First Amendment
protections, the Amendment only provides journalists with a degree of access
that is equal to that which the general public enjoys.22 Because of their general
accessibility, in order to restrict access, the court must weigh the competing
interests.23 To make a determination about the competing interests, the court
assesses the strength of the counter interest and evaluates if those concerns
outweigh the constitutional right it seeks to overcome.24
When certain highly-valued fundamental rights, like those protected in the
First Amendment, are restricted, judges most often apply a strict scrutiny test.25
Under this test, “First Amendment interests are upheld unless the governmental
interest in regulation is compelling, and that interest is achieved in the least
restrictive manner.”26 The likely result of the strict scrutiny test is for the First
Amendment’s interests to prevail over the proposed restriction.27 But to what
result when the competing interest is another highly-valued, fundamental
right?

18. Landman, supra note 11, at 183.
19. Landman, supra note 11, at 183.
20. Landman, supra note 11, at 183.
21. THE FIRST AMENDMENT HANDBOOK, REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS 51 (Gregg P. Leslie ed., 7th ed. 2011).
22. Id. at 59.
23. Id.; BUNKER, supra note 2, at 28.
24. BUNKER, supra note 2, at 28.
25. BUNKER, supra note 2, at 15. The Strict Scrutiny approach originated with the case of
Carolene Products in 1938 when the Court held that “there may be a narrower scope for the
operation of the presumption of constitutionality when the legislation appears on its face to be
within the specific prohibition of the Constitution.” United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S.
144, 152 n.4 (1938). Thus, when speech and freedom of the press are at issue, the court must
engage in a more active judicial review of the encroaching act. BUNKER, supra note 2, at 16.
26. BUNKER, supra note 2, at 15.
27. BUNKER, supra note 2, at 30.
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The Sixth Amendment: An Iron Curtain
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
28
public trial, by an impartial jury. . .”

The roots of the Sixth Amendment’s protections, as with most of the other
amendments in the Bill of Rights, can be traced both to English common law
traditions and to a reaction from British oppression during the colonial
period.29 The Amendment’s protection of a defendant’s right to an impartial
jury is a way for the people to provide a more direct check on their
government.30 This is the view of the Amendment’s protections exhibited in
the Declaration of Independence.31
R. Carter Pittman, a constitutional law scholar and former member of the
Georgia Board of Bar Examiners, has analyzed the Sixth Amendment’s
important role in political history, from the Glorious Revolution in England in
1688, to the American Revolution in 1776.32 Under the protections of the
Amendment, juries would be composed of ordinary people who lived under the
current government, not those who ran the government.33 Pittman states,
“Impartial juries are essential to freedom, just as partial judges or juries are
essentials to despotism.”34 As such, the Amendment stands as an iron curtain
between the accused individual’s liberty and the power of the state.35
The understanding of a criminal jury trial as a check on government power
was further explained in the United States Supreme Court case of Duncan v.
Louisiana. In that case, Defendant was on trial for battery and sought to have a
trial by jury despite a Louisiana state statute that restricted jury trials only to

28. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
29. 6th Amendment US Constitution – Rights of Accused in Criminal Prosecutions, U.S.
GOV’T PUBL’G OFFICE 1397, 1404, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN-1992/pdf/
GPO-CONAN-1992-10-7.pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2016).
30. R. Carter Pittman, The Creation of the Sixth Amendment Right to a Fair Trial, in THE
BILL OF RIGHTS: THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL, 27, 28 (Enid W. Langbert, Esq. ed., 2005). “We
are reminded of years spent in dungeons by martyrs to our liberty; of secret trials by servile
judges, or partial juries sometimes called from afar and often called from the very household of
the tyrant who headed the state . . .” Id.
31. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). The Declaration lists a
history of the grievances suffered at the hand of King George III. Among those listed are “For
depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury: For transporting us beyond Seas to be
tried for pretended offences.” Id.
32. Pittman, supra note 30, at 29. Pittman refers to the fact that tyrannical governments had
“poisoned the streams of justice.”
33. Pittman, supra note 30, at 29.
34. Pittman, supra note 30, at 29.
35. Pittman, supra note 30, at 31; see also NANCY S. MARDER, THE JURY PROCESS 14
(Foundation Press 2005) (explaining the significance of juries in allowing citizens to participate
in government action).
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those offenses punishable by death or imprisonment at hard labor.36 Despite
the state’s argument that the Constitution did not require the individual states
to grant criminal defendants the right to a jury trial, the Supreme Court found
the right to be so fundamental to the concept of justice, that states must afford
this protection to criminal defendants.37
The Court further discussed at some length the history and necessary
purpose that the right to a jury trial has in American jurisprudence.38 Justice
White, writing for the majority, wrote that, “providing an accused with the
right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard
against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant,
biased, or eccentric judge.”39 Thus, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment’s
right to a jury trial in criminal proceedings40 was extended to the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment.41
The Sixth Amendment is an overall conglomerate of American values. It
combines protection of due process rights with an essential citizenship
responsibility.42 In that capacity, it serves two functions. Firstly, as it is
reserved for US citizens, it has often been referred to as a badge, capable of
indicating, “who counts and who does not.”43 Historically, jury service was
denied to women and African-Americans.44 For this reason, serving on a jury
became one outward way to demonstrate the political struggles and eventual
success of these groups in particular.45 Jury service also provides citizens with
a way and means to participate in and understand their democratic
government.46 Because this Amendment combines both a check on tyranny as
36. Duncan v. State of La., 391 U.S. 145, 146 (1968).
37. Id. at 149.
38. See id. at 149–157.
39. Id. at 156.
40. The Court makes a caveat to this statement – petty offenses do not necessarily warrant
this protection. The “possible consequences to defendants from convictions for petty offenses
have been thought insufficient to outweigh the benefits to efficient law enforcement and
simplified judicial administration resulting from the availability of speedy and inexpensive
nonjury adjudications.” Id. at 160.
41. Id. at 147.
42. Thomas Jefferson once said, “I consider trial by jury as the only anchor ever yet
imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its constitution.” Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine (July 11, 1789), in 2 MEMOIR, CORRESPONDENCE, AND
MISCELLANIES, FROM THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 335, 336 (Thomas Jefferson
Randolph ed., 1829).
43. NANCY S. MARDER, THE JURY PROCESS 13, 14 (Foundation Press 2005).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. See generally TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 15, at 315–322. Tocqueville references the
political institutional nature of the jury, noting how this system places the control of justice, and
by extension, of society in the hands of the people, rather than the political elite. He further
remarks on the extraordinary ability of the jury system to educate the people. Id. at 321.
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well as an important duty of citizens, it too holds a special place in American
hearts.
C. The First Amendment vs. The Sixth: The Competition for Top Billing
When such fundamental rights as liberty of the press and the right to an
impartial jury are in competition, what is the result? The Court discussed this
delicate balancing problem in Sheppard v. Maxwell. In that case, the Defendant
was standing trial for the brutal murder of his pregnant wife.47 Prior to his trial,
the media hounded the defendant and published numerous stories and
editorials all attempting to show the defendant’s guilt.48 Once the trial began,
the media intensity only gained in strength – the media had designated table
space right next to the jury box, were given the names and addresses of the
veniremen (which they published), and television news cameras were set up on
the steps of the courthouse to capture images of potential jurors as they entered
and left the courthouse.49 The media frenzy was so great that at times it was
difficult for witnesses to be heard by the jury and for counsel to raise issues
with the judge.50 Although the trial court did impose a rule prohibiting camera
use during the actual substance of the trial, there was no such rule in place to
bar pictures and interviews to occur during court recess.51
Further, jurors were also regularly exposed to the content of this media as
the information gathered by the reporters was then published in that day’s
papers, to which jurors had access during the trial.52 Eleven of the twelve
jurors also testified during voir dire that they had each read or heard about the
case in their local newspapers and television news stations.53 The only real
attempts made by the judge to shield the jurors from this rampage of extrinsic
information, was to merely tell the jury to “pay no attention whatever to that
type of scavenging. Let’s confine ourselves to this courtroom, if you please.”54

Tocqueville says, of the jury experience that it must be “looked upon as a free and ever-open
classroom in which each juror learns his rights, enters into daily communication with the most
learned and enlightened members of the upper classes and is taught the law. . . I believe one must
attribute the practical intelligence and good political sense of Americans primarily to their long
experience of jury service. . .” Id. at 320–321.
47. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 336–340 (1966).
48. Id. Newspaper reports honed in on the fact that the Defendant refused a lie detector test
as well as the fact that his family and friends became very protective of his privacy in order to
make it appear that he had something to hide. Id. at 338–339.
49. Id. at 341–344.
50. Id. at 344.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 345.
53. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 345.
54. Id. at 348.
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The Court’s analysis began by first acknowledging the importance of the
responsible press and openness of judicial proceedings.55 This fundamental
principle is rooted in the notion that the press acts as a check and safeguard
against miscarriages of justice.56 Thus, courts have been extremely hesitant to
set out sweeping limitations on the press’ liberty.57 However, the Court noted
that the press’ free range of publicity must not be permitted to alter and destroy
the legal processes for which the court is in existence to attend to.58 Chiefly,
the Court seeks to uphold a limitation on the press only to the extent that
“jury’s verdict must be based on evidence received in the open court, not from
outside sources.”59 After examining the totality of the circumstances –
including the extensive coverage, the intrusive nature during the trial, and the
exposure of jurors to the media information that was never heard on the
witness stand – the Court determined that Defendant was denied due process
because of the media’s effect on the minds of the jurors deciding the case.60
The Court goes on further to say that while “there is nothing that proscribes the
press from reporting events that transpire in the courtroom,”61 trial judges have
a duty to protect a defendant’s right to an impartial jury from inherently
prejudicial publicity.62
Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart tackled a similar question in Gannett
Co. v. DePasquale. In that case, two Defendants being prosecuted for second
degree murder, grand larceny, and robbery sought to have the press and public
barred from attending their trial out of fear that their presence would generate
adverse publicity that would hinder their ability to get a fair trial.63 Gannett
Co., who owned newspapers that provided quite an extensive amount of
coverage of the crime up to the date of the trial, wrote to the trial judge
insisting their reporters’ rights to cover the trial.64
Justice Potter acknowledged the difficulties of adverse publicity on a
defendant’s ability to receive a fair trial.65 He noted that the difficulty is
particularly present during pretrial suppression hearings because of the very
nature and purpose of those hearings – to screen out evidence that would not

55. Id. at 349–50.
56. Id. at 350.
57. Id. Especially when “there was ‘no threat or menace to the integrity of the trial,’ we have
consistently required that the press have a free hand, even though we sometimes deplored its
sensationalism.” Id.
58. Id. at 350, 351.
59. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 351.
60. Id. at 352.
61. Id. at 362–363.
62. Id. at 363.
63. Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 374–375 (1979).
64. Id. at 375.
65. Id. at 378.
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be submissible to the jury.66 The Sixth Amendment’s guarantees, Potter writes,
are “personal to the accused,” and were created for the benefit of the
defendant, not the public.67 Although there are societal interests in public trials
as safeguards against government secrecy and oppression, the Supreme Court
has found no correlative constitutional right on the part of the public to insist
on their inclusion into criminal or civil cases.68
The battle between these two amendments has been hard-fought. While
both offer significant rights and consideration, it became clear to the courts that
they must reach a verdict. Although the legal community “seemed reluctant to
inhibit media coverage of the criminal justice system, the consensus view
seemed to be that, at some point, the free expression concerns had to give way
to the need to preserve a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial.”69
II. THE RISE OF TECHNOLOGY USE
The rise and increased use of technology has permeated every aspect of
society. People are able to communicate constantly and can find the answer to
any question instantly.70 Improvements in and reliance on technology –
particularly internet use – have presented the judicial system with new
challenges.71 This is especially so when dealing with members of a jury who
might not even realize that what they are doing is in any way wrong.72 With
the prevalence of technology and communication, is it really reasonable to
expect that jurors will refrain from something almost second-nature?
A.

Americans’ Internet and Media Use

The internet “changed the way that people got information and shared it
with each other, affecting everything from users’ basic social relationships to

66. Id.
67. Id. at 379–80 (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 848 (1975)); Id. at 380.
68. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 392.
69. BUNKER, supra note 2, at 63.
70. Hillary Hylton, Tweeting in the Jury Box: A Danger to Fair Trials?, TIME (Dec. 29,
2009),
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1948971,00.html.
Former
jury
consultant and Milwaukee lawyer Anne Reed stated, “Googling for more information is an
unconscious habit for most of us.” She went on to express a worry that leaving jurors unchecked
in their use of Googling information at trials could lead to planting misinformation on the
internet. Id.
71. Id.
72. John Schwartz, As Jurors Turn to Web, Mistrials Are Popping Up, D1–D3 N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 18, 2009), http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/decisions/probin/sc10-51_AppendixD.pdf;
For Modern Jurors, Being on a Case Means Being Offline, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (June 24,
2013, 4:09 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2013/06/24/195172476/JURORSAND-SOCIAL-MEDIA.
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the way that they work, learn, and take care of themselves.”73 To monitor this
continued rise and the challenges that accompany it, the Pew Research Center
seeks to “be an authoritative source on the evolution of the internet through
surveys that examine how Americans use the internet and how their activities
affect their lives.”74 To that end, Pew has collected copious amounts of data
and conducted numerous surveys to demonstrate and evaluate internet and
media use by Americans since the advent of the internet.75
The increased use arguably stems from three waves of technology
revolutions.76 The first wave came in the form of faster internet speeds.77 Prior
to the development and widespread use of broadband, internet users had to rely
on slower dial-up connection.78 In June 2000, for example, 34% of American
adults had dial-up access in their homes as compared to only 3% of broadband
users.79 In contrast, as of May 2013, 70% of adults had a broadband connection
at home, compared to only 3% who still used dial-up service.80
Broadband connections allowed people to spend greater periods of time
online.81 This “always-on connection” changed the way people use the
internet. They were now able to use the internet in a more expansive way. As
of 2011, American adults reported using the internet for personal
communications, looking up general information, using financial services,
consumer services, entertainment, job seeking, and school work.82 This
increase in usage, dependent upon high-speed connection, has resulted in the
internet becoming an integral part of American life.83

73. Three Technology Revolutions, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (2016), http://www.pewinternet
.org/three-technology-revolutions/.
74. Public Opinion Polls and Surveys- Resource Guide, U. S. FL. LIBRARIES (Dec. 8, 2015,
2:18 AM), http://guides.lib.usf.edu/c.php?g=6187&p=28091.
75. Id.
76. Three Technology Revolutions, supra note 73.
77. Kathryn Zickuhr & Aaron Smith, Home Broadband, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (August
26, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/08/26/home-broadband-2013/.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. The United States Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications &
Information Administration’s survey assessment confirms the trend in broadband use, by noting
that “as of October 2012, 72.4 percent of American households (88 million households) have
high-speed internet at home – a 3.8 percentage point increase over the July 2011 figure.”
Household Broadband Adoption Climbs to 72.4 Percent, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN.
(2013), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2013/household-broadband-adoption-climbs-724-percent.
81. Three Technology Revolutions, supra note 73.
82. Exploring the Digital Nation: America’s Emerging Online Experience, NAT’L
TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN. v (June 2013), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/report/2013/exploring-dig
ital-nation-americas-emerging-online-experience.
83. Id.
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The second technology wave arrived in the form of mobile connectivity –
in cellphones, smartphones, and tablets.84 These platforms make information
accessible from any place at any time, thus changing the way Americans
communicate and how they use their time.85 As of 2014, 90% of adults have a
cellphone, 58% of which have a smartphone, while 42% use a tablet.86 As of
May 2013, 63% of adults with cellphones use their phones to access the
internet.87 This number has doubled since 2009 when only 31% of cellphone
owners used the internet from their phones.88 Furthermore, of those who use
their phones to access the internet, 34% rely on their phone for access more so
than on a laptop or desktop.89
The mobile technological wave has made the ease of access to the internet
an important consideration in American life.90 For example, 44% of adult
cellphone owners reported that they sleep with their phones beside their beds
to make sure they would not miss any important updates, while 29% claim
they could not imagine living without their phone.91 Internet use via mobile
devices has led to an instant gratification culture which permeates into almost
every aspect of American life.92
The third, and most recent wave of technology, takes the form of social
media93 These networks have blurred many lines, including the ones between
private and public life, as well as being “a consumer of information and a
producer of it.”94 According to Pew’s research, 74% of adults use social
networking sites, with 42% using multiple sites.95 Breaking that down by
individual media sites, Pew posits that 18% have a Twitter account, 71% have
a Facebook page, 21% use Pintrest, 22% are on LinkedIn and 17% have an

84. Three Technology Revolutions, supra note 73.
85. Three Technology Revolutions, supra note 73.
86. Mobile Technology Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Oct. 2014), http://www.pewin
ternet.org/fact-sheets/mobile-technology-fact-sheet/.
87. Maeve Duggan & Aaron Smith, Cell Internet Use, PEW RESEARCH CENTER 2 (Sept. 16,
2013),
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-media/Files/Reports/2013/PIP_CellInternetUse20
13.pdf.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Mobile Technology Fact Sheet, supra note 86.
91. Mobile Technology Fact Sheet, supra note 86.
92. See Christopher Muther, Instant Gratification is Making us Perpetually Impatient, THE
BOSTON GLOBE, (Feb. 2, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle/style/2013/02/01/the-grow
ing-culture-impatience-where-instant-gratification-makes-crave-more-instant-gratification/q8t
WDNGeJB2mm45fQxtTQP/story.html.
93. Three Technology Revolutions, supra note 73.
94. Three Technology Revolutions, supra note 73.
95. Maeve Duggan & Aaron Smith, Social Media Update 2013, PEW RESEARCH CENTER
(Dec. 30, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/12/30/social-media-update-2013/.
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Instagram account.96 With such a degree of interconnectivity, it is no wonder
that Americans’ use of social media and the internet has become almost second
nature.97
B.

How do We Gather Information?

Americans’ increased use of the internet and social media has had a great
impact on how information is disseminated. The American Press Institute has
provided research in this area to illustrate that point. The API “conducts
research, training, convenes thought leaders and creates tools to help chart a
path ahead for journalism in the 21st century.”98
Recently, the API released the results of a study on how Americans get
their news.99 According to their research, the majority of Americans feel that it
is easier to keep up with news and current events with the expansion of the
digital age.100 This is evidenced in the frequency and methods used by
Americans to get news information. API’s study found that 33% of Americans
follow news stories throughout the day and 49% of adults say they investigate
deeper into stories to which they initially paid attention.101 The research also
revealed the most frequently used devices by which Americans get their news:
television (87%), laptops/computers (69%), radio (65%), print sources (61%),
and cellphones/tablets (56%).102 Adults with smartphones are much more
likely to get their news from social media and the internet rather than more
traditional sources.103 API’s research concluded that the more of these devices
a person owns, the more likely they are to enjoy keeping up with the news
throughout the day.104
API’s research also examined the perceived trustworthiness of the sources
of their news. While social media is growing in importance in terms of
learning news, it remains one of the lowest trusted sources.105 API reports that
“only 15 percent of adults who get news through social media say they have
high levels of trust in the information they get from that means of discovery.106

96. Id.
97. Three Technology Revolutions, supra note 73.
98. About us, AM. PRESS INST., http://www.americanpressinstitute.org/about/about-us/?utm
_content=nav (last visited Jan. 18, 2016).
99. How Americans Get their News, AM. PRESS INST. (March 17, 2014, 3:00 PM),
http://www.americanpressinstitute.org/publications/reports/survey-research/how-americans-getnews/.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. How Americans Get Their News, supra note 99.
106. How Americans Get Their News, supra note 99.
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III. EFFECT OF PRETRIAL PUBLICITY ON POTENTIAL JURORS
“I remember one of those sorrowful farces in Virginia, which we call a jury
trial. A noted desperado killed Mr. B., a good citizen, in the most wanton and
cold-blooded way. Of course, the papers were full of it; all men capable of
reading read about it; and, of course, all men not deaf and dumb and idiotic
107
talked about it.”

The effect of pretrial publicity on jurors and the public at large has long
been a concern. Former Chairman of the FCC and law professor Newton N.
Minow, continues to bolster the position Mark Twain espoused in the above
quote from his 1872 classic, Roughing It.108 Newton states, “I think it’s
madness, in today’s mass media society, to search for jurors who know
nothing.”109 Newton explains his position by using the example of Megan’s
Law.110 The law resulted from a sad case involving a seven-year old girl
named Megan who was abducted, sexually abused, and murdered.111 The
suspect was a recently released convict with a prior sexual abuse record.112 The
community lobbied the New Jersey State Legislature to pass a law requiring
any person convicted of past sexual assaults to notify the community in which
they reside.113 At trial of the man charged with Megan’s murder, potential
jurors were asked during voir dire whether they understood what Megan’s Law
was.114 Jurors who responded affirmatively, were sought to be stricken from
empaneling because defense counsel argued they would incorrectly associate
the defendant with those facts.115 According to Newton, at the time of the trial,
every person in that community knew Megan’s Law, meaning that it would be
nearly impossible to find twelve ignorant jurors.116 Newton concluded, with

107. MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 223 (Reader’s Digest ed., Reader’s Digest Association,
Inc. 1994) (1872).
108. Id. Mark Twain details a jury trial he alleges to have witnessed in Virginia. Id. As he
explains, the jury trial was invented by Alfred the Great in a scramble, yet it has become “the
most ingenious and infallible agency for defeating justice that human wisdom could contrive.” Id.
He goes on to claim that an impartial jury may have been achievable in Alfred the Great’s day
and age, but “in our day of telegraph and newspapers his plan compels us to swear in juries
composed of fools and rascals, because the system rigidly excludes honest men and men of
brains.” Id. Twain expresses his disdain for the jury system for promoting ignorance and perjury
instead of honesty and intelligence by saying, “it is a shame that we must continue to use a
worthless system because it was good a thousand years ago.” Id. at 224.
109. Newton N. Minow, Informed Jurors Can be Impartial, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 92, 94 (Enid W. Langbert, Esq. ed., 2005).
110. Id. at 93–4.
111. Id. at 93.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 94.
114. Id.
115. Minow, supra note 109, at 94.
116. Minow, supra note 109, at 94.
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reference to Chief Justice Marshall’s statements in the Aaron Burr case from
1807, that there is a distinction between an impartial juror and an impartial
jury.117 He stated that the purpose of having twelve people on a jury is “not to
find 12 people who are all the same,” but to find 12 people who will fairly hear
evidence presented.118
Media today is composed of stories produced around the clock, both for
the public’s benefit and for their entertainment.119 With the advances in
technology and internet communication, the concern for tainting the
impartiality of jurors has heightened. The concern is founded in the fact that
high profile trials generate top ratings for news outlets.120 The potential for
sensationalizing criminal trials is great, as media publicity can create biases
within a jury.121
Just as in the example of Megan’s Law with widespread knowledge of its
particulars, how do judges safeguard the impartiality of a jury when potential
jurors today have become so exposed to pretrial media and extraneous
information?
A.

Studies on Exposure to Pretrial Media

To help courts to assess when pretrial publicity risks reach compelling
levels, several studies have been conducted that help explain how the media
can influence decision-making of a panel of jurors. Prior to instant media
access via the internet, researchers conducted surveys and studies focused on
information gained from newspapers and news presented on the television, as
evidenced in Dexter, Penrod & Otto’s 1994 study.122 This study, done just
around the advent of personal computers, summarized several prior studies and
distinguished them from their own findings.123 One such study, conducted by
Costantini and King in 1980-1981, assessed the relationship between the
quantity of information a subject could recall about a case and their level of
prejudgment.124 They found that those with more knowledge about a particular

117. Minow, supra note 109, at 94.
118. Minow, supra note 109, at 92, 94.
119. Michelle-Ramos Burkhart, Overconsumption: Our Media, Our Jurors, and Its Impact on
Our Verdicts, DELIBERATIONS (Nov. 4, 2013), http://jurylaw.typepad.com/deliberations/2013/11/
overconsumption-our-media-our-jurors-and-is-impact-on-our-verdicts.html; We live in a “mediasaturated society,” Minow, supra note 109, at 93.
120. Minow, supra note 109, at 93.
121. Minow, supra note 109, at 93–94.
122. Amy L. Otto, Steven D. Penrod, & Hedy R. Dexter, The Biasing Impact of Pretrial
Publicity on Juror Judgments, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 453, 453–455 (1994).
123. Id.
124. Id.
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case were more likely to have a preconceived bias in favor of the
prosecution.125
Another approach to studying pretrial publicity effects is jury simulation,
whereby a mock trial is set up and the jurors are shown a variety of publicity
specially created for the study.126 In one jury simulation conducted in 1992 by
Dexter, Cutler, and Moran, participates were shown various pretrial publicity
for a week before being shown a video of a mock trial.127 The study concluded
that juries composed of those who were exposed to negative publicity about
the trial beforehand were more likely to convict the defendant even in the face
of a thorough voir dire process.128
However, as Dexter et al. state, the research conducted in this field is not
without its faults and inconclusive results. For that reason, they urge a study of
how pretrial publicity influences the decision-making process of juries, rather
than merely the formation of biases before trial begins.129 To achieve this,
researchers created a trial simulation in which groups of six to twenty
participants were given instructions to treat this as realistically as possible to
actual jury service and were given differing types of media concerning the case
to read.130 After reading “newspaper articles” on subjects ranging from prior
police records of the defendant to statements made by the defendant’s
neighbor, participants were shown a video of the trial, then asked to discuss
their verdicts with the researchers.131 The study concluded that pretrial
publicity certainly has an impact on jurors’ pretrial judgments concerning the
case.132 It also found that while evidence produced at trial has the ability to
lessen the influence of the pretrial publicity, it cannot eliminate the effects
altogether.133
B.

Traditional Solutions to Juror Impartiality – Jury Instructions &
Admonitions

Internet users have the ability to locate information or post a thought
within seconds, and considering the nature and degree of American internet
use, it is no surprise that social media has “wreak[ed] havoc in the jury box.”134
This havoc is encountered when jurors relay thoughts and information learned
125. Id. at 455.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 455–456.
128. Otto et al., supra note 122 at 456.
129. Otto et al., supra note 122 at 457.
130. Otto et al., supra note 122 at 458.
131. Otto et al., supra note 122 at 458.
132. Otto et al., supra note 122 at 466.
133. Otto et al., supra note 122 at 466.
134. Hon. Amy J. St. Eve & Michael A. Zuckerman, Ensuring an Impartial Jury in the Age of
Social Media, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 2, 8 (2012).
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during their jury service through social media.135 This not only aggravates
judges, but it also calls into question the impartiality of jurors.136
Instilling the importance of an impartial jury is a crucial responsibility of
the trial judge.137 In the life of a juror, there exist several occasions where the
trial judge should execute this duty. Traditionally, and most commonly, trial
judges have taken their opportunity in the form of jury instructions and
admonitions to the panel both before the trial begins and at the close of
evidence.138 Research shows that over 80% of judges will issue a model
instruction about refraining from social media or other communication in both
civil and criminal trials.139 Furthermore, almost 65% of judges who do issue
such an instruction do so both before the trial process starts as well as prior to
deliberations.140 The United States Judicial Conference Committee on Court
Administration and Case Management (CACM) has developed the following
model jury instructions to be given both before and after the presentation of the
case:
[Before Trial:] . . . Until you retire to deliberate, you may not discuss this case
with anyone, even your fellow jurors. After you retire to deliberate, you may
begin discussing the case with your fellow jurors, but you cannot discuss the
case with anyone else until you have returned a verdict and the case is at an
end. I hope that for all of you this case is interesting and noteworthy. I know
that many of you use cell phones, Blackberries, the internet and other tools of
technology. You also must not talk to anyone about this case or use these tools
to communicate electronically with anyone about the case. This includes your
family and friends. You may not communicate with anyone about the case on
your cell phone, through e-mail, Blackberry, iPhone, text messaging, or on
Twitter, through any blog or website, through any internet chat room, or by
way of other social networking websites, including Facebook, My Space,
Linkedin, and Youtube.
[At the Close of the Case:] During your deliberations, you must not
communicate with or provide any information to anyone by any means about
this case. You may not use any electronic device or media, such as a telephone,
cell phone, smart phone, iPhone, Blackberry or computer; the internet, any
internet service, or any text or instant messaging service; or any internet chat
room, blog, or website such as Facebook, My Space, Linkedin, YouTube or
135. Id.
136. Id. at 9.
137. State v. Barton, 998 S.W.2d 19, 25 (Mo. 1999). “Control of voir dire is within the
discretion of the trial judge; only abuse of discretion and likely injury justify reversal.” Id. See
also Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 429 (1991).
138. St. Eve & Zuckerman, supra note 134, at 25.
139. MEGHAN DUNN, JURORS’ USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA DURING TRIALS AND DELIBERATIONS:
A REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE
MANAGEMENT 6 (Fed. Jud. Ctr., ed., Nov. 22, 2011).
140. DUNN, supra note 139.
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Twitter, to communicate to anyone any information about this case or to
141
conduct any research about this case until I accept your verdict.

Some 67% of judges issued a jury instruction that deviated from the model
set forth by CACM.142 The Eighth Circuit, for example, adopted this model
jury instruction concerning the duties of jurors in criminal trials,
During the trial, while you are in the courthouse and after you leave for the
day, do not provide any information to anyone by any means about this case.
Thus, for example, do not talk face-to-face or use any electronic device or
media, such as the telephone, a cell or smart phone, Blackberry, PDA,
computer, the Internet, any Internet service, any text or instant messaging
service, any Internet chat room, blog, or Website such as Facebook, MySpace,
YouTube, or Twitter, or any other way to communicate to anyone any
information about this case until I accept your verdict.
Do not do any research – on the Internet, in libraries, in the newspapers, or
in any other way – or make any investigation about this case on your own. Do
not visit or view any place discussed in this case and do not use Internet
programs or other device to search for or to view any place discussed in the
testimony. Also, do not research any information about this case, the law, or
the people involved, including the parties, the witnesses, the lawyers, or the
143
judge.

The purpose of these rules is to attempt to impart upon the jury the significance
of the integrity of the trial process.144 Deciding the case based upon
information obtained outside of the courtroom denies parties their right to a
fair trial.145
In response to the growing prominence of the problem and the varied
responses of judges, Judge Amy J. St. Eve, a United States District Court
Judge in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,146
has written several articles detailing methods used by courts to help curb the
effects of social media in the courtroom. According to one of St. Eve’s
informal jury surveys, several jurors reported that the reason why they did not
yield to the temptation to use social media during the trial or deliberations was

141. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE
MANAGEMENT, PROPOSED MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: THE USE OF ELECTRONIC
TECHNOLOGY TO CONDUCT RESEARCH ON OR COMMUNICATE ABOUT A CASE (Jun. 2012),
http://www.uscourts.gov/file/3159/download.
142. DUNN, supra note 139, at 7.
143. JUDICIAL COMMITTEE ON MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT,
MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE EIGHTH
CIRCUIT: 1.08 Conduct of the Jury 19 (2014), http://www.juryinstructions.ca8.uscourts.gov/Man
ual_of_Model_Criminal_Jury_Instructions.pdf.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 20.
146. See St. Eve & Zuckerman, supra note 134, at 1.
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due at least in part to the judge’s instruction regarding the prohibition on social
media use.147 Judge St. Eve believes that prophylactic measures, especially
jury instructions, can “effectively mitigate the risks of juror misconduct
associated with social media.”148
Judges also rely on other means to try to curb the effects of technology use
by jurors in the courtroom. Some courts have required jurors to sign a
compliance statement or pledge to refrain from social media use, while some
have confiscated electronic devices during the trial or deliberations and still
others have elected to instruct jurors about the prohibition of social media
usage multiple times throughout the trial process.149 Overall, these preventative
measures have been only somewhat successful.150
C. A Solution of Questions – Voir Dire
While current efforts in the form of jury instructions may yield some
success, perhaps the strongest solution lies in a more vigorous voir dire
process. It seems easy to take a teleological approach to the problem and
simply reminisce about a simpler time in the past when communities were not
so interconnected and plugged in. However, the problem is as old as the press.
There have always been means of communicating and distributing information
about which a community concerns itself. As technology has advanced, this
preoccupation with being “in the know” has only escalated. Today’s world is
so saturated and dependent upon technology – from WiFi in our homes and
offices, to smartphones and tablets that allow us to communicate with anyone,
anytime, anywhere – that its use is almost compulsive. How then, can we
remotely expect our jurors to refrain from the perpetual bombardment of news
and information when it has become a force of habit? Perhaps the most
effective way to ensure juror impartiality is not with old method jury
instructions, but in effectively choosing which jurors to empanel.
Voir dire is the “preliminary examination of a prospective juror by judge
or lawyer. . . Loosely, the term refers to the jury-selection phase of a trial.”151
The purpose of the process is “to determine whether they are qualified, and
competent, and can act impartiality.”152 In a criminal case, the purpose of voir

147. St. Eve & Zuckerman, supra note 134, at 21–22.
148. St. Eve & Zuckerman, supra note 134, at 24.
149. St. Eve & Zuckerman, supra note 134, at 20.
150. St. Eve & Zuckerman, supra note 134, at 24; Anita Ramasastry, Why Courts Need to
Ban Jurors’ Electronic Communications Devices, FINDLAW, Aug. 11, 2009, http://writ.news.find
law.com/ramasastry/20090811.html.
151. Voir Dire, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
152. 50A C.J.S. Juries § 474 (2015).
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dire is to ensure that a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial by an
impartial jury is upheld.153
The jury selection process is such a crucial step in ensuring a fair jury trial,
yet it is often one of the poorest utilized segments. This is attributed the
inadequacy of attorney performance, the reluctant disappointment of federal
judges, and the distaste of the process by jurors.154 In a series of questionnaires
drafted by STARR and used at CLE seminars between 1997 and 2000 in
Arizona, judges, prospective jurors, and trial lawyers were asked to name their
concerns with the voir dire process.155 Judges’ top concerns included the fact
that lawyers tended to preach during the allotted time rather than determining
which of the panel were unqualified; it wasted court time; lawyers were not
prepared to ask the right questions and even when they did ask relevant
questions they were unable to effectively process the answers they received.156
Prospective jurors stated that they were concerned by the fact that lawyers do
not seem to listen to the potential jurors; lawyers are perceived to pick on the
jurors they do not like and belittle them; and the questions asked by the
lawyers invade privacy of the potential jurors.157 Finally, trial lawyers showed
concern that the time allotted for questioning was too short to be helpful;
opposing counsel wastes time trying to bond with prospective jurors; and
prospective jurors lie on their questionnaires and offer untrustworthy answers
during voir dire.158
Interestingly, all three surveyed groups also listed that the voir dire process
that it is too boring.159 This is because lawyers talk too much during the
questioning.160 The ideal time allotment would be a 30/70 split – lawyers
would speak only 30% of the time, allowing potential jurors to respond to
questions and express their views for 70% of the time.161 If this balance is not
met, the wrong questions – the questions that do not seek information that
would help in determining qualified jurors – are being asked.162

153. Id.
154. Rachel Harris, Questioning the Questions: How Voir Dire is Currently Abused and
Suggestions for Efficient and Ethical Use of the Voir Dire Process, 32 J. LEGAL PROF. 317, 320–
322 (2008).
155. V. HALE STARR & MARK MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION 18-6 (4th ed. 2009).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 18-7.
159. Id. at 18-6–18-7.
160. Id. at 18-7.
161. STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 155, at 18-7.
162. STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 155, at 18-7.
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Once the pool of potential jurors has been brought into the courtroom, the
jury selection process begins.163 After a brief introduction by the trial judge of
the type of case, the judge and the lawyers may proceed with their
questioning.164 While there is no statutory or judicially created test for
determining impartiality of jurors, the voir dire process seeks to determine,
through series of targeted questions, the possible presence of impartial
jurors.165 A liberal attitude should be taken by judges so that as long as the
scope of the questioning corresponds with the purpose of uncovering
prejudices or biases so as to construct an impartial jury, the questions will be
permitted.166
Although voir dire has been used, unwisely, more as a type of preliminary
opening statement,167 the more appropriate purpose of the process is to obtain
“information, information, information.”168 It is important for trial lawyers to
elicit information regarding the potential for partiality, analytic abilities, and
group dynamics in order to ensure the fairness of a trial.
Discovering which jurors can actually be impartial and which have
insurmountable prejudices is the “single most important factor determining the
outcome of a case within the control of the trial lawyers.”169 The most effective
way to procure such information is through open-ended questions.170 Openended questions allow the individual to go into more detail about their own
experiences and attitudes and therefore will be of more use than a simple yes
or no answer.171 Questions like, “what do you do at work?” and “tell me about
your views on punitive damages,” will not only provide information about the

163. How the Courts Work Jury Selection, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/public_education/resources/law_related_education_network/how_courts_work/juryse
lect.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2016).
164. Id. “The court may examine prospective jurors or may permit the attorneys for the
parties to do so.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a)(1). There is an analogous rule allowing either the judge
or the lawyers to conduct voir dire in civil cases as well. FED. R. CIV. P. 47(a).
165. 50A C.J.S. Juries § 474 (2015).
166. State v. Ousley, 419 S.W.3d 65, 73 (Mo. 2013). The Missouri Supreme Court reaffirmed
the principle from State v. Clark, 981 S.W.2d 143, 146 (Mo. 1998) that a sufficient voir dire is
included in the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial jury. Id. See also State v. Granberry, 484
S.W.2d 295, 299 (Mo. 1972).
167. Harris, supra note 154, at 322. Using voir dire to inappropriately influence jurors, while
it wastes court time and annoys judges and jurors alike, could also violate the Professional Rules
of Conduct that govern lawyers. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.2; MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.5.
168. STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 155, at 18-9.
169. MARDER, supra note 43, at 67; STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 155, at 18-15.
170. MARDER, supra note 43, at 67; STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 155, at 18-15;
Kenneth M. Mogill & William R. Nixon, Jr., A Practical Primer on Jury Selection, 65 MICH. B.J.
52, 54 (1986).
171. Jeffrey T. Frederick, Effective Voir Dire, 16 COMPLEAT L. 26, 26–28 (1997).
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individual’s opinions, but will also allow jurors to open up to the process in
general.172 Avoiding questions that encourage jurors to look good is also
essential.173 Jurors, like all people, are reluctant to admit that they would have
trouble being fair and impartial.174 Asking the question, “Do you believe you
could be a fair and impartial juror,” is a useless question. It provides little
insight into the juror’s frame of mind and only invites a predictive answer in
the affirmative.175
The concern over identifying prejudices due to pretrial publicity and
exposure to extraneous information during voir dire was raised famously in
Mu’Min v. Virginia. Defendant was a convicted murderer serving a 48-year
prison sentence when, during his fifteenth year, he was transferred to work
detail at the Virginia Department of Transportation.176 While there, Defendant
escaped briefly and went to a nearby shopping center where he murdered a
storeowner.177 During the months leading up to his trial, numerous newspaper
articles were written about the pending case and detailed the defendant’s prior
criminal record as well as facts about the investigation of the murder.178 The
trial court declined to utilize any of the defense counsel’s proposed questions
during voir dire that related to pretrial publicity.179 Instead, the trial judge
simply asked generic questions to gauge whether any of the panel members
had prior knowledge of the case.180
Despite the seemingly cursory questioning, the Supreme Court held that
this was sufficient.181 While questions aimed at discerning the source and
content of the pre-trial publicity would be helpful, helpfulness is not enough to
constitutionally compel an inquiry into the specific content of the sources.182
The Court found that unless the amount and intrusiveness of pretrial publicity
reached severe levels, voir dire is not constitutionally required to delve into the

172. Id. at 26.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 418 (1991).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 420.
180. Id. at 420. The trial judge did not ask about the source or content of the prior knowledge.
Instead, he asked the following questions: “Would the information that you heard, received, or
read from whatever source, would that information affect your impartiality in this case?” and “. . .
In view of everything you’ve seen, heard, or read, or any information from whatever source that
you’ve acquired about this case, is there anyone who believes that you could not become a Juror,
enter the Jury box with an open mind and wait until the entire case is presented before reaching a
fixed opinion or a conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused?” Id.
181. Mu’Min, 500 U.S. at 431.
182. Id. at 425.
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content of the publicity.183 The voir dire process is left chiefly to the discretion
of the trial court as gatekeeper of fair trials.184
Voir dire also provides the opportunity to question the potential jurors
regarding their “analytic ability and tendency toward authoritarianism.”185 An
individual’s analytic ability is a sought-after trait because it helps an individual
make important distinctions and assists in understanding complex issues.186 On
the other hand, individuals with a tendency toward authoritarianism are less
valued on juries because they are more likely to make up their minds early on
in the presentation of evidence and less likely to accept the presumption of
innocence.187
Another key element to search for on voir dire is that of the group dynamic
– understanding what role each individual juror is likely to play.188 This
requires attorneys to identify potential leaders, followers, “fillers,” negotiators,
and those able to withstand pressure to conform through both personality and
status.189 For example, leaders may be identified via social interaction or
vocation, while the followers may be identified as those less forthcoming in
their decisiveness.190 The individuals who will simply fill the position are
likely the most silent during the voir dire process and are likely to go along
with the majority.191
Negotiators – individuals identified by their pride in considering all
perspectives – will play an important role in deliberation as they will be able to
initiate compromise and cohesion.192 Finally, those with the ability to fiercely
hold onto their opinion should be approached with caution and may be
identified by their disdain for authority and pride in nonconformity.193 It is

183. Id. at 428; MARDER, supra note 43, at 73. See Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) for an
example of a “severe level” of pretrial publicity. In that case, pretrial publicity consisted of “a
barrage of newspaper headlines, articles, cartoons and pictures . . . during the six or seven months
preceding his trial . . . newspapers in which the stories appeared were delivered regularly to
approximately 95% of the dwellings in Gibson County and . . . the Evansville radio and TV
stations, which likewise blanketed that county, also carried extensive newscasts covering the
same incidents.” Irwin, 366 U.S. at 725.
184. Mu’Min, 500 U.S. at 431. See also Ex parte Spies, 123 U.S. 131, 179 (1887) (explaining
that a trial court’s determination of juror partiality ought not to be set aside unless “error is
manifest” in the decision.
185. Kenneth M. Mogill & William R. Nixon, Jr., A Practical Primer on Jury Selection, 65
MICH. B.J. 52, 56 (1986).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 56–57.
190. Id. at 56–57.
191. Mogill & Nixon, supra note 185, at 57.
192. Mogill & Nixon, supra note 185, at 57.
193. Mogill & Nixon, supra note 185, at 57.
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crucial for attorneys to pay attention to and cultivate a suitable group dynamic
in order to enhance the probability of receiving an unbiased consideration at
trial.194
After the completion of questioning, either lawyer may request that a
specific juror be excused “for cause,” meaning the potential juror had a conflict
of interest, or the party had a valid reason for seeking dismissal.195 In addition,
each party may exercise a limited amount of peremptory challenges.196 In
contrast to for cause challenges, a peremptory challenge “need not be
supported by a reason unless the opposing party makes a prima facie showing
that the challenge was used to discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity, or
sex.197 Both challenges allow both parties to select the most impartial jury in
order to satisfy the right to a fair trial.198
IV. IN MISSOURI
The issues surrounding the exacerbation of tensions between the First and
Sixth Amendments by both pretrial publicity and other extraneous information
made accessible by increased technology use are not confined to federal courts
or distant locales.199 By examining how Missouri courts have approached these
challenging issues, one is able to grasp the difficulty in reigning in the
misconduct.
A.

Avoiding “Prejudicial Haste”200: State v. Mayfield

Recently, Missouri courts had to address the issue of publicity introducing
new evidence into the minds of jurors in the case of State v. Mayfield.
Defendant Mayfield was charged with twelve counts of illicit sexual conduct
with minors in 2007.201 At the close of the presentation of evidence, the jury
began its deliberations on a Thursday afternoon.202 After almost nine hours, the
jury had not yet reached a decision and requested a recess over the Veterans’
Day weekend.203 When the jurors reconvened, they were asked if any had been

194. Mogill & Nixon, supra note 185, at 57.
195. How the Courts Work, supra note 163.
196. In a federal civil case, each side has three peremptory challenges. FED. R. CIV. P. 47(b);
28 U.S.C. § 1870 (2015). In a criminal case, the number of challenges depends on the type of
crime involved. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b).
197. Challenge BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
198. See How the Courts Work, supra note 163.
199. Amanda McGee, Juror Misconduct in the Twenty-First Century: The Prevalence of the
Internet and Its Effect on American Courtrooms, 30 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 301, 325 (2010).
200. State v. Mayfield, 220 S.W.3d 422, 426 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007).
201. Id. at 423.
202. Id. at 424.
203. Id.
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exposed to information in the media concerning the present case, to which six
jurors responded affirmatively.204
The trial judge conducted a thorough debriefing of each juror and
concluded that only two of the six had been made aware of new information
not presented at trial.205 The two jurors admitted to watching a television news
story about Mayfield’s prior convictions and prison sentences.206 However,
after questioning the jurors, the judge was satisfied with the jurors’ statements
that they would not allow the news story to affect their own deliberations.207
After Mayfield was convicted by the jury and his motion for a mistrial was
denied, he appealed his conviction on a theory of being unfairly prejudiced by
the news story two of the jurors had watched.208 Although the Court
acknowledged that the jurors should not have watched the news story, the
Court found that their exposure was not sufficiently prejudicial to justify
overturning Mayfield’s conviction.209
They reached this decision in examining the trial judge’s debriefing of the
potentially biased jurors.210 Because they did not share the new information
with other jurors, assured the judge that they would not allow that information
to affect their deliberations, and because there was substantial deliberations
prior to the jurors learning the new information, appellate court did not find the
jury’s deliberations to be tainted.211
B.

The “Ubiquitous Addiction”212: Ross-Paige v. St. Louis Metropolitan
Police Department

The issue of Googling and Wikipedia use during jury deliberations was
tacked by the Missouri judiciary in the case of Ross Paige vs. the St. Louis
Metropolitan Police Department.213 Ross-Paige filed suit against the Police
Department for sexual harassment and retaliation following the filing.214
Following the jury’s deliberations, they found against Ross-Paige on her claim

204. Id.
205. Id.
206. State v. Mayfield, 220 S.W.3d 422, 424 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 424. The news story Jurors Windsor and Eirvin watched revealed that Mayfield
had previously been convicted and sentenced for similar crimes – assaults on two minor children.
Furthermore, the story referred to Mayfield as a “sexual predator.”
209. Id. at 425.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 425–26.
212. Ross-Paige v. St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, No. 1122-CC10917, slip op. at
11 (Mo. Cir. 2014).
213. Id. at 8–9.
214. Id. at 1.
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of discrimination, but in favor of her claim of retaliation.215 The jury awarded
Ross-Paige $300,000 in damages and $7,200,000 in punitive damages.216
Facing such a large judgment, the Police Department filed motions both
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial.217 The Court
quickly dismissed with the motion notwithstanding the verdict and moved on
to consider the motion for a new trial.218 The motion for a new trial was based,
in large part, on the allegation of juror misconduct during deliberation.219 The
conduct the defendant referred to was the “gathering of extrinsic evidence
concerning matters under deliberation.”220
In this case, the juror used his cellphone to access Google in order to find a
Wikipedia article that defined ‘punitive damages’.221 When the juror was
questioned about his conduct, he stated that he had not adequately understood
the meaning of punitive damages when the jury was instructed to deliberate on
the matter.222
The Court unequivocally stated that the juror’s conduct was wrong.223
Throughout the trial, the Court repeatedly advised the jury that they should not
do any outside research of their own about the issues of the case, nor should
they use the internet or other forms of communication in relation to the matters
before them.224 Furthermore, the Court discussed its concerns about the danger
of using electronic communication in the deliberation process.225 Extrinsic
information found online can produce incorrect and prejudicial information
that could undermine the entire trial process.226
Despite the Court’s admonition of “such knucklehead juror misconduct,” it
found there to be no prejudice in the matter and dismissed the motion for a new
trial.227 It reached this decision after considering whether the jury’s decision
was based on information they heard presented in the trial or whether it was
reached based on information gained outside the confines of the courtroom.228
The Court recognizes the naivety of “hermetically sealed, antiseptically
cloistered, and totally immune” jurors who would be able to set aside “stray

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Ross-Paige, No. 1122-CC10917 at 4.
Id.
Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9–10.
Id. at 10.
Ross-Paige, No. 1122-CC10917 10–11.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 13.
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comments in the halls of the courthouse, prattle around the dinner table at
home, or public policy opinions blathered in the news media.”229 Once the
Court was satisfied that the ultimate decision of the jury was not inconsistent
with the information presented in trial, they found that the juror’s misconduct
did not warrant setting the verdict aside.230
C. J.T. ex rel. Taylor v. Anbari
The Court of Appeals for the Southern District of Missouri had to weigh in
on the issue of social media use by jurors during trial in the case of J.T. ex rel.
Taylor v. Anbari on January 23, 2014.231 The case involved the failed diagnosis
and negligent treatment of petitioner’s mother.232 After trial, the jury returned a
verdict in favor of Dr. Anbari and the Taylors appealed the decision, in part, on
the grounds of juror misconduct.233 During the trial, one juror, Doenning
posted such comments to his Facebook as: “Reporting for jury duty – at
Greene County Judicial Facility,” “Civic duty fulfilled and justice served. Now
where’s my cocktail ? ? ? ?”234
The Court found the juror’s comments on social media did not warrant a
reversal of the jury’s verdict. In reaching that decision, the Court’s analysis
focused on the balance between avoiding the appearance of bias, and the
reality of living in a technologically-entrenched society. In support of avoiding
bias, the Court stated that the “purpose of the rule against communications
between jurors and third parties is to prevent the jury from receiving
information about the case that is not part of the evidence in record.”235 To
ensure that even the appearance of impartiality is avoided, the court should
engage in a fact specific inquiry into the impartiality of the juror.236 Here, the
Court noted that the juror’s comments were not related to the specifics of the
case, but rather were more akin to what he ate for lunch.237
The Court also posits a rather realistically-focused dicta concerning the
modern age. They note,
We now live in an age of ubiquitous electronic communications. To say the
comments in this case, which simply informed people Doennig was serving
jury duty, were improper simply because they were posted on Facebook would

229. Id.
230. Ross-Paige, No. 1122-CC10917 at 12.
231. Ex rel. Taylor, 442 S.W.3d 49, 49 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014). Although this was a civil case,
the issue of juror misconduct via social media is no different from the applicable analysis in
criminal cases.
232. Id. at 52.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 58.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Ex rel. Taylor, 442 S.W.3d at 58–59.
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be to ignore the reality of society’s current relationship with communication
technology. This can be seen by looking at the content of these messages. If
they were communicated to a person face-to-face, they would not be improper.
The comments in this case were more similar to those that would be involved
when a person informed his or her supervisor or co-workers they would not be
238
at work because they had jury duty.

By taking this approach, the Court was able to weigh the need for combatting
impartiality with the reality that technology and social media are
omnipresent.239 As a result, the Court found that Juror Doenning’s Facebook
posts were sufficiently limited and did not divulge any case details, such that,
despite his failure to abide by the Court’s instructions, it did not warrant the
verdict’s reversal.240
V. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS ON MISSOURI’S APPROACH
These presented cases demonstrate three importantly related subcategories
of issues raised by the tensions between the First and Sixth Amendments. The
courts each shy away from setting a bright line rule and opt instead for a fact
specific inquiry. This is wise given the numerous ways in which this issue
could affect jury deliberations – from Googling information, to making phone
calls during deliberations, to speaking to media about the case. The courts have
each used the approach of examining whether the information jurors obtained
outside of the evidence presented sufficiently tainted their ability to decide a
case. The Anbari case gives the best discussion of realistic approach to this
problem.
Weighing the importance of avoiding even the appearance of impartiality
against the omnipotence of internet accessibility allows the court to discuss its
abhorrence of this type of jury misconduct while still recognizing that it does
not necessarily warrant reversal in every case. As evidenced in previously
discussed studies and writings, it is clear that courts are concerned with this
behavior and its potential for infringing upon the rights of defendants and the
adversary system as a whole. By trying to develop new jury instructions and

238. Id. at 59–60.
239. See State v. Polk, 415 S.W.3d 692, 695–96. This case shows that prosecutors, as well as
jurors, are susceptible to the ubiquity of social media. Circuit Attorney Jennifer Joyce commented
on her Twitter account concerning the trial of a man accused of raping an eleven year old girl
twenty years previously. Joyce’s posts on Twitter included, “David Polk trial next week. DNA hit
linked him to 1992 rape of 11 yr old girl. 20 yrs later, victim now same age as prosecutor,” and “I
have respect for attys who defend child rapists. Our system of justice demands it, but I couldn’t
do it. No way, no how.” Id. Although the Court was troubled by Joyce’s statements, the risk of
tainting the jury’s perception of the trial, and especially by the timing of the comments, they held
that the comments did not rise to the level of substantial prejudice and, therefore, the conviction
was not reversed. Id.
240. Ex rel. Taylor, 442 S.W.3d at 59.
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other tactics to combat this problem, judges are sending a clear signal that care
must be taken to halt this conduct.
While these cases take a realistic approach to these issues, perhaps they
missed an opportunity posit a more effective way to root out the problems at an
earlier stage in the trial process. At the state level, voir dire is generally left to
the attorneys, although the court may participate as well.241 Additionally,
Missouri courts prefer counsel to use oral voir dire rather than only
questionnaires in order to garner the most useful information.242 In criminal
cases, Missouri attorneys are supposed to be given a fairly wide latitude into
the questions they pursue, although there are some limits.243
These more open and receptive rules promote the importance of the voir
dire process. Furthermore, these rules favoring attorney-conducted voir dire,
combined with case law that takes a realistic approach to determining
impartiality of jurors, provides a platform for a more robust voir dire process
as the favored solution to counter the effects of pretrial publicity and jurors’
use of technology in the courtroom. Upon asking the right questions and
allowing jurors to open up about their internet exposure and social media use,
attorneys could better discover which jurors are likely to access media or
information from others online despite court admonition to refrain from so
doing.
Tackling the source of the problem as early as possible is the best solution.
While there is no guarantee that attorneys would be able to discern with
complete accuracy those jurors predisposed to accept pretrial publicity or to
seek out further information about the trial, more of an attempt to do so should
be made. These questions may very well be the best solution for protecting the
impartial jury from the encroachment of outside influences.
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